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Traumatic Neurosis as a Distinct Cause
of Action
David S. Lake*
Every time the body suffers an injury, there are concomitant
emotional effects. Because these effects frequently exceed
the physical damage and sometimes are the only remaining
vestiges of the injury, the lawyer more and more is seeking
the aid of the psychiatrist and the psychologist.
He is well advised to do so, for he may otherwise be over-
looking an important aspect of his client's case--traumatic
neurosis.'
M UCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN about the so-called traumatic neu-
rosis.2 But in all the literature and litigation there is no
clear cut agreement as to what, if anything, the term traumatic
neurosis means. To further complicate matters, most cases deal-
ing with traumatic neurosis are in the area of workman's com-
pensation. Very few common law cases have dealt with trau-
matic neurosis by that name.
The purpose of this article is: (1) To define traumatic neu-
rosis on a medico-legal basis. (2) To determine when damages
may be recovered for traumatic neurosis through a review of
recent cases.
Strictly speaking, there is no single ailment or disease
known as "traumatic neurosis." Rather, it is a group of neuroses,
characterized as having their onset following trauma. Laughlin
3
speaks of them as neurotic reactions which have been attributed
* B.A., Youngstown University; Second-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.
1 Loria, Traumatic Neurosis, 3 Lawyer's Medical Cyclopedia 139 (1959).
2 See Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev.
497 (1922); Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, 30 Va. L.
Rev. 193 (1944); Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 Va. L.
Rev. 87 (1943); Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis,
6 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 428 (1957); Koskoff, Tr. and Tort Trends 368 (1958);
Miller, Compensation Neurosis, 4 J. For. Sci. 159 (1959); Crawfis, Conver-
sion Hysteria, 26 Ins. Counsel J. 158 (1959); Neurosis Following Trauma: a
Panel, 7 Med. Tr. T. 23 (1960); Sindell and Perr, Subjective Complaints v.
Objective Signs, 12 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 42 (1963).
3 Laughlin, The Neurosis in Clinical Practice, 633 (1956), states that the
resulting emotional or physical consequences are highly variable in degree
and in time of onset.
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to or which follow a traumatic event or a series of such events.
A clearer picture can be had if we define, individually, the words
trauma and neurosis.
Trauma
The promiscuous use of the word trauma or traumatic event
has led to much confusion. "Trauma is simply a force which
invades the sanctity of the person .... ," 4 This force may be phys-
ical,5 chemical, electrical, or radiological; "it may even be emo-
tional, causing an insult to one's psyche . .. " ' The psychiatric
significance of the word trauma refers to harm caused by psy-
chological factors rather than physical ones. Throughout the
balance of this article, the words trauma or traumatic will indi-
cate an emotional shock rather than physical blow or wound.
According to some opinion a physical injury is never the direct
cause of a neurosis.
7
Neurosis
A neurosis,8 is "an unconscious attempt to show a conflict
by development of symptoms without any organic basis." 9 Or
it is sometimes classed as a "functional nervous disorder with-
out demonstrable physical lesion." 10
4 1 Cantor, Traumatic Medicine and Surgery for the Attorney 4 (1959).
5 The use of the word trauma solely to connote a physical blow or a phys-
ical injury caused by physical contact has done much to cause confusion in
both the courts and the literature about traumatic neurosis.
6 Cantor, op. cit. supra n. 4; see also Ortkiese v. Clarson & Ewell Engineer-
ing, 126 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1961) at 561, "Trauma is an injury, wound, shock,
or the resulting condition or neurosis"; substantially the same definition
in Lyng v. Rao, 72 So. 2d 53, 56 (Fla. 1954); Smith v. Garside, 76 Nev. 377,
355 P. 2d 849, 852 (1960).
7 See 6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 229 (1960).
8 As opposed to a psychosis, which can be characterized as "a major emo-
tional disorder, in which a greater or lesser part of the reality accepted by
other members of the patient's group or culture is rejected and replaced
by private beliefs which are held so strongly as to be the major determi-
nants of the patient's thought, feeling, and/or behavior." Schwartz, Neuro-
sis Following Trauma, 4 Trauma 31, (1) (1959).
9 Turner v. W. Horace Williams Co., 80 So. 2d 162, 163 (La. App. 1955); see
also Chapman v. Finlayson, 197 F. Supp. 568, 107 P. 2d 196 (1940).
10 McGill Mfg. Co. v. Dodd, 116 Ind. App. 66, 67; 59 N. E. 2d 899, 900 (1945);
Tate v. Gullett Gin Co., 86 So. 2d 698, 702 (La. App. 1956); Williamson v.





The American Psychiatric Association does not officially rec-
ognize the word traumatic as descriptive of a type of neurosis;
rather they allude to the "neurotic reactions to trauma." Many
other factors not related to trauma may act as precipitating
causes of the neurosis. Modlin says, "A neurosis is a neurosis,
whatever the particular precipitating stress. .. ." 11
The neuroses following trauma are usually divided into two
categories: the conventional neuroses, and the so-called trau-
matic neurosis.
Conventional Neuroses
There are six types of conventional neuroses. 12 Each type is
characterized by a unique group of clinical symptoms. For ex-
ample, the conversion reaction (also known as conversion hys-
teria) has its own set of symptoms. Here, strong emotions fol-
lowing trauma are unconsciously converted into easily identi-
fiable symptoms, such as paralysis, muscular contractions, loss
of sensation, or areas of numbness.1 3 Although there is no organ-
ic basis for the symptom presented by the patient, it should be
stressed that there is nothing conscious in this sort of symptom.
It is a means of reacting to a severe emotional shock.
14
Traumatic Neurosis
As the term is most commonly used, traumatic neurosis is a
combination, symptomatically, of the conventional neuroses. The
person involved has experienced a "clear and unavoidable per-
ception of great and overwhelming danger, the threat of death
or severe injury." 15 He may or may not have received an actual
11 Modlin, The Trauma in "Traumatic Neurosis," 2 Menninger Clinic Bul.
49, Vol. 24 (1960).
12 They are anxiety reaction, dissociative reaction, phobic reaction, de-
pressive reaction, conversion reaction, and obsessive-compulsive reaction.
A detailed description of each of these neuroses is beyond the scope of this
article. A good legally oriented treatment of this material can be found in:
Schwartz, op. cit. supra n. 8; Laughlin, op. cit. supra n. 3; 3 Schweitzer,
Proof of Traumatic Injuries, 160-168 (1961).
13 Schweitzer, op. cit. supra n. 12.
14 Schwartz, op. cit. supra n. 8. This seems to be the generally accepted
view; "The statement that a financial settlement is the best cure is not ac-
curate, as the litigation may be an aggravating factor in the patient's illness.
He may try to dramatize his condition (both consciously and unconscious-
ly) to impress his attorney, his physician, and to a great extent, himself";
Schweitzer, op. cit. supra n. 12 at 160, 161.
15 Id. at 70.
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physical injury. Following this emotional shock (which, in these
cases, is often more severe and lasting than any physical injury
that might have been received) he develops several symptoms.
These include: fearfulness, insomnia, blackouts, fatigue, palpita-
tion, headache, dizziness, nightmares (often a re-enactment of
the traumatic event), tremors, irritability, etc. It is these symp-
toms which are labeled traumatic neurosis. And most of these
symptoms are included in the legal and medical definitions of
shock.16 Now let us review the law with respect to traumatic
neurosis.
Quite logically, if a given court will allow recovery for an
item labeled fright, or shock, or mental disturbance, there should
be no question of recovery when the plaintiff presents a proven
traumatic neurosis. Further, there is considerable authority to
the point that definite nervous disturbances or disorders caused
by a mental or emotional shock and excitement are "physical
injuries," for which damages may be recovered. 1 7
In Nelson v. Black,1 8 the court points out that the sufferer
from traumatic neurosis is not a malingerer. His disability is not
feigned, but real, although no basis for it can be found in any
physical injury. The court, in Williamson v. Bennett,19 concludes
that:
neurotic reactions accompanied by severe headaches, dizzi-
ness, crying spells, irritability, back pains and similar mani-
festations, resulting from fright caused by defendant's negli-
gence are held to justify recovery on the ground that they
amount to and should be regarded as "physical injuries."
There is no valid reason why recovery should not be allowed
where the defendant's negligence causes a traumatic neurosis,
16 See Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 329 S. W. 2d 293, 298 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959); cf. Haile's Curator v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 60 F. 557, 559 (5th Cir.
1894); Blakiston, New Gould Medical Dictionary (2d ed., 1955).
17 Dryden v. Continental Baking Co., 11 Cal. 2d 33, 77 P. 2d 833 (1938); cf.
Edmen v. Vitz, 88 Cal. App. 2d 313, 198 P. 2d 696 (1948); Prosser, Law of
Torts 39 (2d ed. 1955).
Is 266 P. 2d 817 (Cal. App. 1954); rev'd. 43 Cal. 2d 612, 275 P. 2d 473 (1954)
on the grounds that whether or not an injury was sustained was a question
for the jury; the court in its opinion quotes from Herzog, Medical Juris-
prudence Art. 388 at page 291, "Hysteria (conversion reaction) is a disease
and the hysterical patient actually suffers the disabilities of paralysis,
anesthesia, loss of power, or paroxysm, which he claims. Many physicians
do not understand hysteria and because they cannot see any demonstrable
evidences of organic disease, deny the existence of disease, and claim that
the hysterical patient is simulating or malingering."
19 251 N. C. 498, 112 S. E. 2d 48 (1960); citing Kimberly v. Howland, 143




the same as where that negligence causes a broken arm, or cut
leg. But, logical as it may seem, the courts are not in complete
agreement. Two distinct philosophies appear in the recent cases:
1) The presence of impact and/or physical injury is necessary
for recovery and/or 2) Recovery may be allowed without the
presence of impact where mental disturbance is sufficiently
proved.
Impact and/or Physical Injury Jurisdictions
Until recently, New York could claim the title as one of the
last of the impact states. This dubious distinction was based on
the decision in Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co.,20 which denied
recovery for a miscarriage caused by fright and shock occasioned
by the negligence of the defendant. The following statement by
the court has been cited as authority in almost thirty jurisdic-
tions:
While the authorities are not harmonious upon this ques-
tion, we think the most reliable and better considered cases,
as well as public policy, fully justify us in holding that the
plaintiff cannot recover for injuries occasioned by fright, as
there was no immediate personal injury-
The court was quite concerned that, should the right of
recovery once be established (1) A "flood of litigation" would
result; (2) The injury complained of (fright, shock, etc.) could
easily be feigned without detection and (3) Damages must then
rest upon mere conjecture and speculation.
Now that New York has relinquished her "impact" throne
it has been snapped up by Pennsylvania, which holds that there
can be no recovery of damages for fright or nervous shock un-
less it is accompanied by physical injury or physical impact.21
Bosley v. Andrews 2 is often cited in those jurisdictions still re-
quiring impact. In that case, a woman was chased by a trespass-
ing bull, but she was not actually touched. The court used some
excellent language to say "no impact, no recovery." This court
went on to point out that there could be no recovery for phys-
20 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896), rev'd Battalla v. State, 10 N. Y. 2d 237,
219 N. Y. S. 2d 34 (1961).
21 Cucinotto v. Ortman, 399 Pa. 26, 159 A. 2d 216 (1960); Gefter v. Rosen-
thal, 384 Pa. 123, 119 A. 2d 250 (1956); Potere v. City of Phila., 380 Pa. 581,
112 A. 2d 100 (1955).
22 184 Pa. Super. 396, 135 A. 2d 101 (1957), aff'd 393 Pa. 161, 142 A. 2d 263
(1958).
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ical injury as a consequence of the fright.2 3 However, any slight
physical injury, such as an electrical shock,24 is a sufficient foun-
dation upon which to build an award for mental disturbance.
Ohio cases show substantially the same result,2 5 with the
added twist of foreseeability. Any injury negligently inflicted
must be foreseeable as the probable result of that particular act
of negligence.
2 6
The Sullivan27 case is a good example of Massachusetts logic.
The plaintiff drank milk from a carton which contained a dead
mouse and its fecal matter. She sustained no substantial physical
injuries, but the emotional shock caused her to develop a rash
over much of her body, made her nervous, and caused her blood
pressure to increase. The court held that, as there was no injury
from without (mental suffering was purely internal), there could
be no recovery. 28 But even in Massachussets a gradual chipping
away at this harsh rule is evident. A slight injury is enough to
allow recovery for nervous shock.29 A passenger of a railroad,
who twists her shoulder when she jumps from her seat to escape
danger from a broken window, can recover damages.30
Most of the Illinois cases hold that there must be a con-
temporaneous physical injury with the fright or emotional dis-
turbance.3'
Greenberg v. Stanley32 typifies the rule in New Jersey that
there must be impact or physical injury; but the slightest per-
sonal injury is enough to allow recovery. A pregnant woman
who sustained personal injuries was allowed recovery for emo-
23 Ibid, citing Koplin v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 322 Pa. 333, 185 A. 744 (1936).
24 Hess v. Philadelphia Transport Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A. 2d 89 (1948).
25 Barnett v. Sun Oil Co., 113 Ohio App. 449, 172 N. E. 2d 734 (1961); Davis
v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 135 Ohio St. 401, 21 N. E. 2d 169 (1939); Koontz v.
Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N. E. 2d 694 (1936).
26 Davis v. Cleveland Ry. Co., supra n. 25; Barnett v. Sun Oil Co., supra
n. 25, the court quotes approvingly from 39 0. Jur. 2d 494: "The doctrine
of reasonable anticipation or foreseeability of the consequences of one's
negligent act is clearly a part of the negligence law of Ohio ....
27 Sullivan v. H. P. Hood & Sons Inc., 168 N. E. 2d 80 (Mass. 1960).
28 Citing Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R., 168 Mass. 285, 45 N. E. 88 (1897)
which was the forerunner of the present Massachusetts "injury from with-
out" attitude.
29 Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737 (1902).
30 Freedman v. Eastern Mass. St. Ry., 299 Mass. 246, 12 N. E. 2d 739 (1938).
31 McCullough v. Orcutt, 14 Ill. App. 2d 503, 145 N. E. 2d 109 (1957).
32 51 N. J. Super. 90, 143 A. 2d 588 (1958), young mother in an auto acci-




tional upset and anxiety over possible injuries to her unborn
child.33
Some courts hold that there must be malice, wilfulness,
wantonness, or inhumanity to allow recovery for mental distress
where there has been no accompanying physical injury.34
Oklahoma courts find themselves committed to the rule that
there must be physical suffering or injury to the person.35 How-
ever, they held that mental anguish induced by physical hunger
pains was actionable. 36
Arkansas relies on impact, but concedes that the impact may
be constructive. 37
Where a bus turned over, slightly injuring the plaintiff, who
then suffered an hysterical reaction, a Montana court made an
allowance for mental and physical pain and suffering, with the
warning that the disability must have followed as the proximate
consequence of the injury.38
The District of Columbia allows recovery only where the
emotional disturbance was the secondary effect of a substantial
physical injury,39 and there must be an unbroken chain of causa-
tion.40
Virginia holds that mental anguish resulting from mere neg-
ligence, without physical injury, cannot be the basis of an action
for damages.4 1
Texas allows recovery where the mental disturbance results
33 Carter v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 47 N. J. Super. 379, 136
A. 2d 15 (1957); cf. Buchanan v. West Jersey R. Co., 52 N. J. L. 265, 19 A.
254 (1890); Caspermeyer v. Florsheim Shoe Store Co., 313 S. W. 2d 198 (Mo.
App. 1958).
34 Gambill v. White, 303 S. W. 2d 41 (Mo. 1957), unattended woman had
premature delivery in hospital, no recovery allowed.
35 Redding v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 871 (W. D. Ark. 1961).
36 Thompson v. Munnis, 201 Okl. 154, 202 P. 2d 981 (1949).
37 Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E. D. Ark.
1959); cf. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Caple, 207 Ark. 52, 179
S. W. 2d 151 (1944).
38 Wilson v. Northland Greyhound Lines Inc., 166 F. Supp. 667 (D. Mont.
1958); cf. Bourke v. Butte Electric and Power Co., 33 Mont. 267, 83 P. 470
(1905).
39 Hamilan Corp. v. O'Neill, 273 F. 2d 89 (D. C. Cir. 1959).
40 Perry v. Capital Transit Co., 32 F. 2d 938 (D. C. Cir. 1929).
41 Herman v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 149 F. Supp. 417 (E. D. N. Y. 1957),
where, after an emergency landing the plaintiff's intestate alleged nervous-
ness, bruises, and soreness, the court held no recovery.
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in a physical injury.42 Or, if the act is wilful or intentional,
damages are recoverable if the result should have been reason-
ably anticipated as a natural consequence of the wilful act.
43
However slow to recognize mental suffering as a cause of action,
Texas does recognize that a neurosis, with its physical aches and
pains, is a "physical injury" for which recovery can be had."4
This is another example of clinging to an old rule, but allowing
equitable causes to form exceptions to that rule.
Georgia follows a modified rule: if the mental suffering is
followed naturally by physical injury which the defendant
should have foreseen, recovery will be allowed for injury caused
by fright alone.45 However, if there is no physical injury to the
person or no pecuniary loss, damages for mental anguish alone
cannot be recovered. 46
"No" Impact Jurisdictions
California is probably the most liberal state with respect to
recovery for mental disturbance. The established rule is the one
laid down in Sloan v. Southern California Ry. Co.,47 where the
court said:
The real question presented . . . is whether the subsequent
nervous disturbance of the plaintiff was a suffering of the
body or of the mind. The interdependence of the mind and
body is in many respects so close that it is impossible to dis-
tinguish their respective influence upon each other.
The plaintiff had a previous history of nervous shocks and par-
oxysm, but the court held that it was not material whether the
42 Houston American Finance Corp. v. Travis, 343 S. W. 2d 323 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960), rehearing denied (1961), lender attempted to collect money
owed; Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 110 S. E. 2d 716 (W. Va. 1959).
43 Stafford v. Steward, 295 S. W. 2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
44 Sutton Motor Co. v. Crysel, 289 S. W. 2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956), the
court also points out that whether a neurosis is a proximate result of the
fright is a jury question.
45 Hines v. Evans, 25 Ga. App. 829, 105 S. E. 59 (1920); Usry v. Small, 103
Ga. App. 144, 118 S. E. 2d 719 (1961).
46 Armstrong Furniture Co. v. Nickle, 105 Ga. App. 61, 123 S. E. 2d 330
(1961).
47 111 Cal. 668, 44 P. 320 (1896), note that case was decided the same year
as Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co. supra n. 20, but 3000 miles apart, the plain-
tiff bought a ticket to travel to a distant city. Enroute she changed trains.
However she was not given a ticket stub. The new conductor demanded
that she pay or get off. She had no money so she was put off. After walk-




defendant knew of the plaintiff's susceptibility to nervous dis-
turbance. 48
Virginia seems to be on both sides of the "impact" fence.
Where the defendant's car struck a house, and the exterior wall
fell in toward the plaintiff, who fainted and suffered aggravation
of an old arthritic condition and a psychoneurosis, the court held
this to be both mental and physical personal injury, and dam-
ages were allowed.49 The only question in Virginia is whether
the damage is of substance and easily identifiable in the person
of the plaintiff. 50
Wilful or wanton conduct will support an action for dam-
ages for mental suffering even where there is no physical injury
of any sort.51 In actions for personal injuries due to an inten-
tional tort, physical injuries need not be sustained, as the men-
tal suffering is usually considered an injury for which damages
may be given.5
2
Where a truck struck the porch of a house, and the plain-
tiff in the house suffered fright and nervous shock, damages
were recovered on the basis that the shock produced injuries
which would be elements of damages had bodily injury been
suffered. 53 But the negligence must be the proximate cause of
the shock.54
Recovery is allowed in Florida if the emotional distress is
inflicted in the course of intentional or malicious torts.55 Some
jurisdictions use the "natural and probable consequence test," as
where the defendants put an oil drilling rig in a cemetery, stop-
ping the plaintiffs from visiting the grave of their son.56 Before
48 DiMare v. Cresci, 23 Cal. Rptr. 772, 373 P. 2d 860 (1962), which cites
Sloan with approval.
49 Penick v. Mirro, 189 F. Supp. 947 (E. D. Va. 1960), the court also held
that if there is no actionable physical or pecuniary damage, willful or
wanton conduct is necessary.
50 Ibid.
51 Olan Mills Inc. v. Dodd, 353 S. W. 2d 22 (Ark. 1962); Erwin v. Milligan,
188 Ark. 658, 67 S. W. 2d 592 (1934); Rogers v. Williard, 144 Ark. 587, 223
S. W. 15 (1920); Smith v. Aldridge, 356 S. W. 2d 532 (Mo. App. 1962),
(blasting causing fear by parents for safety of children); Ackerman v.
Thompson, 356 Mo. 558, 202 S. W. 2d 795 (1947).
52 Skousen v. Nidy, 90 Ariz. 215, 367 P. 2d 248 (1961), rehearing denied
(1962).
53 Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A. 2d 149 (1959).
54 Ibid; also see Drlo v. Connecticut, 128 Conn. 231, 21 A. 2d 402 (1941).
55 Slocum v. Food Fair Stores Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958).
56 Busburs v. Graceland Cemetery Assoc., 171 F. Supp. 205 (E. D. Ill. 1958);
cf. Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Ill. App. 293, 106 N. E. 2d 742 (1952).
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recovery can be had for mental suffering alone, there must be
a breach of duty owed the plaintiff by the defendant.57
Clegg v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co.5 ' is a good example
of traumatic neurosis. The case was submitted to the jury on the
basis of the Louisiana doctrine which allows recovery for emo-
tional damages even though unaccompanied by physical injury.59
Washington allows damages even in the absence of any phys-
ical injury, when caused by a wrongful act, intentionally done.60
But the harm must be foreseeable. 61
Where bodily injury follows fright or shock, South Caro-
lina allows recovery in cases of negligence.62
The Wisconsin case of Colla v. Mandella6 3 allowed a recov-
ery for physical injury resulting from fright alone, even though
a normal man (without heart trouble) would have suffered no
substantial injury.64 There need not be impact if the physical
injury flows directly from the fright.65
After the Colla case came McMahon v. Bergeson,66 where a
psychiatrist testified that the plaintiff was suffering from an
57 Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1961);
Lafitte v. New Orleans City & Ry. Co., 43 La. Ann. 34, 8 So. 701 (1890);
Haile v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 135 La. 229, 65 So. 225 (1914).
58 264 F. 2d 152 (5th Cir. 1959), Clegg was standing nearby where a truck,
swerving to avoid hitting some school children, ran into parked cars and a
gasoline pump, causing fire and widespread destruction. He was over-
whelmed by fear, realizing for the first time that he was not the omnipotent
and fearless man his phyche had envisioned him to be. After this event,
Clegg experienced all the symptoms of traumatic neurosis. He further be-
came very successful in business, which the psychiatrists said was causing
further harm to him. The jury decided for the insurer on the basis of the
evidence not proving causation to a clear enough degree.
59 Ford v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 139 So. 2d 798 (La. App. 1962);
Pecoraro v. Kopanica, 173 So. 203 (La. App. 1937); Klein v. Medical Build-
ing Realty Co., 147 So. 122 (La. App. 1933); Laird v. Natchitoches Oil Mill
Inc., 10 La. App. 191, 121 So. 692 (1929).
60 Browning v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P. 2d
859 (1959); United States v. Hambleton, 185 F. 2d 564 (9th Cir. 1950);
Nordgren v. Lawrence, 74 Wash. 305, 133 P. 436 (1913).
61 Christensen v. Swedish Hospital, 368 P. 2d 897 (Wash. 1962); Browning
v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle, supra n. 57; Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash.
134, 233 P. 299 (1925).
62 Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distributing Co., 232 S. C. 593, 103 S. E.
2d 265 (1958); Douglas v. Southern Railway, 82 S. C. 71, 63 S. E. 5 (1908).
63 1 Wis. 2d 594, 85 N. W. 2d 345 (1957).
64 Citing with approval, Restatement, 2 Torts, Sec. 461; cf. Sundquist v.
Madison Rys. Co., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N. W. 392 (1928).
65 Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N. W. 625 (1909).
66 9 Wis. 2d 256, 101 N. W. 2d 63 (1960), auto accident without physical




anxiety neurosis. The court said that recovery for neurosis fol-
lows the same rule as for emotional distress alone. However,
where there is a pre-existing susceptibility to emotional disturb-
ance on the part of the plaintiff, there can be no recovery unless
the defendant had prior knowledge of that susceptibility. 7
The most encouraging decision of the recent cases is Battalla
v. State.68 The infant plaintiff was placed in a chair lift at Bell-
ayre Mountain Ski Center by a state employee, who failed to
secure and properly lock the safety belt. As a result, the infant
became frightened and hysterical upon descent, with resulting
emotional injuries. The court held that there may be recovery
for injuries, physical or mental, caused by fright negligently in-
duced, specifically overruling Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co.69
They stated that a rigorous application of the rule would be un-
just as well as opposed to experience and logic, and further, that
to add another exception to the present rule would merely add
confusion to a situation which lacks the coherence which preced-
ent should possess. The court quoted approvingly from Woods
v. Lancet,70
We act in the finest common law tradition when we adapt
and alter decisional law to produce common law justice ...
Legislative action there could, of course, be, but we abdicate
our own function, in a field peculiarly non-statutory, when
we refuse to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court-
made rule.
The only substantial policy argument of Mitchell is that
damages or injuries are somewhat speculative and difficult
to prove. However, the question of proof in individual situ-
ations should not be the arbitrary basis upon which to bar
all actions.
This decision should have a great effect in those states which
still follow the Mitchell7 ' rule. It will be interesting to see what
new rationale the courts will devise to maintain the "impact"
rule.
67 Ibid; the court held for the defendant on the basis of pre-existing sus-
ceptibility; a strong dissent cited Colla v. Mandella, op. cit. supra n. 63 as
reason for allowing recovery.
68 10 N. Y. 2d 237, 219 N. Y. S. 2d 34 (1961); see 66 Dickinson L. Rev. 239
(1962) for an extensive review of the Mitchell and Battalla cases.
69 Supra n. 20.
7O 303 N. Y. 349, 355, 102 N. E. 2d, 691, 694 (1951); citing also Comestock v.
Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931).
71 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., supra n. 20.
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Fear For Another's Well-Being
While most states allow recovery for mental disturbance
arising out of fear for one's own safety, they generally deny re-
covery for fright, shock, anxiety, or neurosis, precipitated by the
fear for the safety and well being of another. 72
An auto guest who suffered injuries could not recover for
shock, strain, and anxiety to his pregnant wife, who had not been
in the accident.73 A pregnant woman, who suffered a miscar-
riage as a result of witnessing an accident involving her hus-
band, was denied recovery.74
Most cases hold that the right to damages is personal, hence
one cannot recover for fright and mental disturbance over in-
juries to another.75 In cases other than death,76 it is held that a
parent cannot recover for his own mental distress and shock
about personal injuries to his minor child.77 There must be a
duty owed directly to the party claiming damages and mental
suffering. 78
Conclusion
While the term traumatic neurosis has no place in current
psychiatric nomenclature, it is reasonably descriptive of the
plaintiff's problem. Whenever possible, the clinical description
of the plaintiff's neurosis should be used, rather than this general
term.
72 See 25 C. J. S. Damages § 67-70; cf. Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N. C. 498,
112 S. E. 2d 48 (1960), which gives a good review of past litigation in this
area.
73 McCullough v. Orcutt, supra n. 31.
74 Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P. 2d 80 (1957); cf. Clough v.
Steen, 3 Cal. App. 2d 392, 39 P. 2d 889 (1934), death of plaintiffs child in
same collision; Kelly v. Fretz, 19 Cal. App. 2d 356, 65 P. 2d 914 (1937),
learning of physical injury to third party; Minkus v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
of Cal., 44 F. Supp. 10 (N. D. Cal. 1942).
75 Vinet v. Checker Cab Co., 140 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 1962); Jines v. City
of Norman, 351 P. 2d 1048 (Okla. 1960); Cushing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Francis, 206 Okl. 553, 245 P. 2d 84 (1952); Van Hay v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 205 Old. 154, 235 P. 2d 948 (1951).
76 Honeycutt v. American General Ins. Co., 126 So. 2d 789 (La. App. 1960),
rehearing denied 1961; Hughes v. Gill, 41 So. 2d 536 (La. App. 1949).
77 Preece v. Baur, 143 F. Supp. 804 (E. D. Idaho 1956); Hayward v. Yost, 72
Idaho 415, 242 P. 2d 971 (1952); Bedard v. Notre Dame Hospital, 151 A. 2d
690 (R. I. 1959); Sumone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R. I. 186, 66 A. 202 (1907);
cf. Gaegler v. Thomas, 173 F. Supp. 568 (D. Md. 1959), where recovery was
allowed to child where his mother was killed and father injured in auto-
mobile accident.
78 Lahann v. Cravotta, 228 N. Y. S. 2d 371 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Berg v. Baum,




Traumatic neurosis can be treated, but this is difficult while
the litigation is pending, as the litigation tends to focus the pa-
tient's attention upon his disability. However, to stigmatize him
because of this unconscious factor tends to prolong his illness
and increase his damages. 79
Most medical authorities will agree that a neurosis is more
than mental suffering, and should be regarded as a physical ail-
ment. Some of the more enlightened courts have agreed.
A review of recent cases indicates that a majority of states
allow recovery for a traumatic neurosis if it can be proved:
1. That there was a duty of care owed directly to the plain-
tiff by the defendant.
2. That the defendant did some negligent act which fright-
ened or shocked the plaintiff.
3. That the plaintiff's neurosis was a direct result of the
defendant's negligent act.
4. That the plaintiff's neurosis is a physical injury.
Even in those states which still require an impact, the ex-
ceptions have considerably weakened the rule. The Battalla case
should further weaken and, hopefully, overrule so useless a rule.
It is a sad reflection on the law, when it will not accept medical
proof of a mental injury.
One last warning: "traumatic neurosis" and "compensation
neurosis" are not the same thing. The term "compensation neu-
rosis" is used by a few doctors and lawyers to indicate that the
plaintiff's neurosis will immediately be cured when he receives
a money settlement. This is not true. Litigation tends to aggra-
vate the patient's condition and hence to increase the damages.
79 See 6 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts, 215, 216 (1960).
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